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Dull from Baghdad
A portrait of cooperation, luck, and determination

Will Podmore's Political Agenda
Fine rebuttal of Bush and Blair's war propagandaHiro notes that the 1991 war against Iraq killed from 57,600 to 62,600 people, and cost Iraq $200 billions' worth of damage. US and British bombers dropped 140,000 tons of bombs, equivalent to seven Hiroshimas.
He points out that the UN's weapons inspection team, Unscom, was compromised by the US government which illegally inserted CIA operatives and by its co-operation with Mossad, the Israeli secret service. As the Pentagon stated, "information supplied by the monitors had played a part in the careful selection of targets" for the subsequent continual bombing attacks.
Hiro reports that by April 1998 Unscom and the International Atomic Energy Authority had destroyed all Iraq's missiles, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons facilities. As Martin Indyk, the US assistant secretary of state for the Middle East, confirmed in September 1999, "We do not at this point have evidence of any kind that Saddam Hussein is attempting to rebuild his arsenal."
So how, after twelve years of the most punishing sanctions in history, could Iraq produce weapons of mass destruction? If Bush and Blair had the evidence, they would surely have told us!
Some claim that UN Resolution 687 gives the US the legal warrant to take 'all necessary measures' to change Iraq's regime. But the Resolution guaranteed the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait border and authorised 'all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter'. It "does not talk about getting rid of leadership", as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed. And as the British commander in the 1991 war, General Peter de la Billiere, noted, he had no mandate to invade Iraq or to take over the country. Nor did Resolution 688 authorise military action: the US and British governments tried to add the 'authority to use force', but China and India successfully opposed this. So Bush and Blair have no legal mandate for war.


Most complete GA dictionary, but confusing.
Anyone going to Persian gulf countries this is good

Ok coverage, but boring
You will feel like an insider

A must read before the start of the second Gulf war
Something Wicked This Way Comes
Excellent book.

Incredibly uninspired technothrillerThis was a horrible book - the author spends so much time and crams in so many obscure and unnecessary details about military aviation, and wastes so much effort trying to convince his readers about what he knows that his writing never comes close to convincingly detail what it must be like to sit inside of a monster jet fighter. Instead of concentrating on one of the characters, the narrative meanders between different fliers - the mythic Dragon, the "Weasel Twins" (a pair of electronics geniuses who appear to be the Steve Jobbs and Steve Wozniak of the military aviation community), the aged aircrew of a grizzled F-4 Phantom (they refused to transition to the "hated F-16") and a younger American who's determined to learn form dragon. There is no plot development, and the characters are non-existent behind their facades as fighter pilots. You don't have to write like Henry James to turn out at least a very decent technothriller. Nothing else will grab you here - the war scenario in the mideast seems like the same thing you've seen in other books and countless flight simulator games. The enemy is too thin to even rate being called "cardboard" - physically and morally scarred, with an agenda, weapons of mass destruction and the ear of corrupt Soviets, he's closer in consistency to that thin sheet stuff they put on overhead projectors. Skinner took half of an interesting idea, and killed it. The idea of a story about mercenary fighter pilots is cool because it avoids the trap of letting or forcing the author to swap the action we want for tired demonstrations of his experience with the bureaucratic nuts and bolts of an established air force. However, the idea only works if the writer replaces the boring stuff with the action we want. Also, since the story puts the mercenary pilots essentially in charge of themselves, we would have a unique opportunity to see what an air force would look like if it were run by the people who do the flying. Skinner doesn't just flub on that score, he doesn't deal with it at all - the pilots never form a cohesive unit, they just fly. Skinner's idea essentially takes all the boring guts out of your standard military aviation novel, and doesn't put replace it with anything.
Pulp Fiction.I read this book back in 1992 when I was 14 and it gave me the idea to create online 'squadrons' on the Prodigy network's bulliten boards that drew up offline mission story lines for flight-sim nuts, and tied them into huge online storylines/campaigns, before the advent of good campaigning sims/online multiplayer play. As far as I know, my "First Air" or FAR was the first such organization in a catagory that has since boomed and become very involved now that people can fly and fight togather through the wonder of the Net.
Also gave me the pipe dream of buying my own F8 Crusaider and going off to fight as an aireal mercinary.
As another asside, it was also the inspiration for the 1993 release of Origin's "Strike Commander"
Stupendous Action-Thriller

Too much errors to be taken too seriouslyHowever, the Rendall's analysis of the facts are weak and offers little, if any, new material or new insights. This is made even worse due to the numerous factual errors regarding equipments and terms. The combat stories are quite lively, but they are also plagued with errors that reduce its value to nothing more than an action story. Furthermore, whoever edited the final manuscript should either get a slap in the head or buy a better spell-checking software (preferably both) for letting so many typos slip beyond his (her?) nose.
Comparison to other books are inevitable. Two books comes to mind. The first is the classic Flight of the Intruder (Coonts). Although it is fiction, its attention to the technical accuracy is much better than this book. The other book is Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam 1965-1972 (Michel). Although much narrower in scope (it only covers the Vietnam War), it offers a much stronger analysis both in technological and political terms. Furthermore, the combat stories contained in Clashes are also both more exciting and much, much more accurate.
I cannot really recommend this book to anyone, except those who can look past the errors.
Of small value, superficial and inaccurate.Rendall's work is so USAF-centric, and "pointy-nose" focussed it could have been written by the fighter desk of the USAF's Public Affairs Office. Thoroughly ignored is any aircraft bearing an "A" or "B" prefix even if it is a jet. In addition, aircraft bearing the markings "USN" or "USMC" are only mentioned grudgingly.
As a result a major piece of the history of "jet" combat in Korea is ignored, including the USN's and USMC's vital roles in providing effective close air support to prevent the collapse of the Pusan perimeter. Subsequent historial investigation has revealed USAF close air support to have been ineffective, with North Korea and Chinese survivors going so far as to state that they "feared the blue planes the most." This critical effort is instead coopted to USAF F-84s.
The tremendous contributions of A-4 and A-6 fliers in Vietnam are almost entirely ignored. So too AV-8B, A-7 and A-10 fliers in the Gulf War. To all appearances, only F-100s, F-105s, F-4s, F-111s fought in Vietnam, and F-117s F-15s and F-16s in the Gulf. The crucial role of USN F-8 squadrons in showing the way to the reinstitution of gunfighting and the formation of Top Gun during the lull in the Vietnamese air war is entirely absent. So too is any mention of the F-8's unrivaled kill ratio in that conflict. Instead, Rendall's only nod to the USN is to document Cunningham and Driscoll. One suspects that had they not been the very first aces of that war, they too would have been ignored.
The two Gulf of Sidra incidents, and Operations Eldorado Canyon and Praying Mantis are not even mentioned.
His understanding of electronic warfare and precision munitions is pathetically bad. Once again he is blindly USAF-centric, laboring under the misconception that the E-3 and the E-8 are the sole hubs of the constellation of aircraft involved in electronic missions. His descriptions of precision weapons' guidance are very poor and misleading. His description of Gulf War Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses is particularly bad, and displays an ignorance of the geography, the weapons' capabilities and the techniques employed.
Once again he utterly misses the contribution of the USN, which provided better than half of the SEAD sorties that destroyed Iraq's air defense systems, and misattributes USN SEAD tactics to USAF aircraft.
The proof of the work's superficiality lies in the bibliography, which reads--with few exceptions--like a listing of works on jets which were available at Rendall's corner bookstore. His writing is almost exclusively from secondary sources and "picture books."
If you're interested in Vietnam jet combat, buy Michel's "Clashes," Tillman's "MiG Master," and Nichols and Tillman's "On Yankee Station." The last is listed in Rendall's bibliography, but he appears not to have read it (Cunningham and Driscoll's exploits excepted). For the Gulf War, I recommend Murray's "Air War in the Persian Gulf" and Friedman's "Desert Victory."
A Fascinating View of Air Warfare DevelopmentI do NOT agree with other reviewers who compare it unfavorably to more narrowly focused books or complain about focus on the U.S. Air Force (there's a lot about German, British, Israeli and non-Western air forces) And let's face it: the U.S. Navy did not have good enough jets to maintain air superiority in Korea and in Desert Storm the Navy only downed two Iraqi jets compared to 30 for the USAF (and half of THOSE were accounted for by one unit!). The number of misspellings, typos and date errors is relatively minor and NOT distracting from the overall book quality.
Besides well-written complex narratives explaining how tactics and weapons use evolved over time, Rendall emphasizes the importance of human factors in achieving battlefield air superiority. While it's important to have the highest quality aircraft and weapons, it's still - to date, at least - pilot ability and tactical leadership make the ultimate difference. This is most strongly illustrated by Israel's ability on many occasions to establish air superiority - with air-to-air kill ratios of 50-to-1 - even with comparable aircraft and Britain eventually beating back Argentine aircraft that outnumbered them by more than 6-to-1.
One of Rendall's most thoughtful insights is the fundamental advantage of Western culture's celebration of individual excellence, competition and initiative. Non-Western air forces, most significantly the Soviet Union, relied heavily on central ground control of large numbers of aircraft and mediocre pilots rather than letting a small number of superior pilots and air warfare leaders act with individual initiative. Soviet training showed its spectacular weaknesses in the annihilation of its client states' air forces, most notably Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
There's a fascinating description of declining Soviet pilot skill levels during the 1970s-80s due to their leftwing obsession with a form of pilot "affirmative action". Rendall says that to ensure weaker pilots would not be "left behind", and thereby reflect badly on the pilot selection/training establishment, the Soviets systematically reduced pilot training standards. They had many outstanding pilots, but their average pilot skill level steadily declined even as their aircraft performance and weapons quality increased.
At the end of the book I understand how Western - especially American/Anglo - air forces came to dominate their actual and potential adversaries. However the incredible cost of developing and deploying new aircraft is almost beyond the range of even the United States - an F-80 cost $90,000 in 1946 and today's fighters can cost more than $30,000,000! And if the United States ever loses a couple of AWACS at the same time during combat the air battle will quickly descend into total confusion. Finally, Western air forces and other superior military capabilities have driven our adversaries to employ suicide bombers and other asymmetrical tactics not easily countered by conventional forces (Saddam Hussein is probably the only person in the world dumb enough to take on the U.S. armed forces (twice!))
I REALLY enjoyed this book and recommend in the highest possible terms to anyone interested in modern warfare, late-20th Century international conflicts and the history of technological development. Rolling Thunder's weakest point is its unfortunate title, which was the name of an air campaign that, despite pilot skill and gallantry, was notably ineffective while losing and resulted great aircraft and aircrew losses due to strategic, political and leadership flaws at the highest levels of the U.S. military and civilian government.


Excellent -- this book will challenge your preconceptionsSwofford swears like a sailor and writes like a pro, but everything else about him is 100% USMC. This book isn't pretty -- it delivers as many troubling truths about war and soldiers as it does inspiring tales of incredible valor. But it's a must-read for anyone curious about what life is like, physically and mentally, for the military personnel who fought in Iraq then, as well as now. Highly recommended, unless you are easily offended by lots of cursing or talk about private parts. I'm looking forward to reading more of Swofford's writing soon -- hope he keeps churning things out!
"Jarhead" brought back a lot of memories...The Corps is a place where you rub shoulders with colorful individuals and see interesting places regardless of your job category, and Swofford's excellent story-telling skills took me back to that period with a sharp immediacy. This is a tribute to the author's writing style and no-holds-barred honesty, which are both exemplary. His descriptions of boot camp and the Fleet during that era are absolutely spot-on, and the extreme personalities he encountered are uncomfortably real archtypes of "Uncle Sam's Misguided Children." Of course, he shares a large number of lurid personal anecdotes, but that's the way things were (and probably still are) in the Corps. Indeed, Swofford does not sugarcoat the Corps as an institution, so don't expect an "ooh-rah" account of Marine Corps life. But he still finds humor in the midst of the headgames, while dealing with weightier philiosophical questions about the brutality of war.
Anyone who was (or is) in the Corps's enlisted ranks will immediately identify with the author, regardless of their MOS. In addition, those seeking insight into the Marines who are currently fighting Saddam's legions will find "Jarhead" a compelling insider revelation. Swofford's story is not disrespectful to the Corps, but it is honest and real. He is to be commended for writing this important book.
Real Patriots Don't SugercoatThe book is an honest account of one man's struggle to reconcile his sense of duty with his awareness that he is an expendable pawn in a game of dubious moral validity. The author's intelligence makes it impossible for him to blindly accept his role and mission without question. Nevertheless, military discipline and honor prevail and Swofford is able to keep his demons at bay while giving us a dramatic look into the alcohol fueled testosterone fest that is the life of a young marine. The fact that Swofford and his mates manage to take care of business in spite of their own opinions and emotional baggage (and the author's got a few steamer trunks worth) is a testament to their own character and the solid training and professionalism of the USMC. Swofford and his buddies are a sordid lot but this makes the book all the more compelling. It's nice to read about soldiers that have foibles just like the rest of us. The overprevalence of Saturday matinee idol-like characters in military literature (e.g. Tom Clancy) that are so squeaky clean you think they were grafted off of Ward Cleavers's leg gets a little tiresome after a while. The grunts in Jarhead are like any other group of young men. They are predisposed toward drinking and being obsessed with sex. Their ribald behavior makes the book a highly entertaining read but is definitely not for the faint of heart.


i have to give up when the story became so contritei lost my patience....this author's english writing is very good, besides that, i really don't know what else we got here.
Details are very lacking........ Sad.
not a bad writing. the plot also good enough to read on

Garbage BookOther than that his book is useless as it does not touch on the cultural aspects on the region.
It's the PERSIAN Gulf not the "Arabian" Gulf
Worked well for meAnd to the person who gave one star to this guide because of it's reference to the "Arabian Gulf": relax. If you say "Persian Gulf" to anyone in the Arab Gulf states they will have no idea what body of water you are talking about. I suppose you would be equally upset if 25 years ago a guidebook to China refered to the capital as "Beijing" instead of the Western imposed name "Peking"?
The book was dull, there is no way around it. The author kept focusing on his drinking and the issues with this ministry and that ministry - not the most exciting. I wanted more detail on what it was like in Baghdad leading up to and during the war - - all the author gave us was what it was like for him in his hotel. Overall I would skip the book and watch the movie.